Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
> On 2021-08-08 10:10 a.m., Scott Dorsey wrote:
>> J. P. Gilliver (John) <G6JPG@255soft.uk> wrote:
>>> On Sat, 7 Aug 2021 at 13:30:12, sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote
>>> (my responses usually follow points raised):
>>> []
>>>> In any case, it's likely that Apple will back down from device
>>>> scanning, there's just been too much push-back from privacy advocates,
>>>> LGBTQ+ organizations, and religious freedom groups.
>>>
>>> Do you think such push-back will have any _real_ effect? Apple (and any
>>> other company), whatever they say publicly, are only interested in the
>>> bottom line. Lots of people _say_ they'll not buy Apple any more if
>>> Apple do this (or _say_ they'll vote
>>> Republican/Democrat/Labour/Liberal/Conservative), but I suspect Apple
>>> have a fairly good grasp of how many will actually _do_ (or not do)
>>> that. Which is probably not a large number. Especially among (mostly)
>>> the young who seem less concerned about privacy than we old codgers.
>>
>> I don't think the pushback will have any effect, but the lawsuits from
>> false positives may well have some. At least in the US. The Europeans
>> seem to take privacy concerns more seriously, and they use Apple products
>> too.
>
> If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
> that false positives really aren't a problem...
>
> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Technology_Summary.pdf>
>
> ...and that's the opinion of people far more knowledgeable than you or I
> on the subject:
>
> 'Apple has found a way to detect and report CSAM offenders while
> respecting these privacy constraints. When the number of user photos
> that are in the CSAM database exceeds the threshold, the system is able
> to detect and report this. Yet a user photo that is not in the CSAM
> database remains invisible to the system, and users do not learn the
> contents of the CSAM database.'
>
> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_Mihir_Bellare.pdf>
>
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mihir_Bellare>
>
>
> 'Apple’s approach preserves privacy better than any other I am aware of:
> Apple receives an encrypted record from the device for every picture.
> But cryptographic results guarantee that Apple will be able to see
> visual derivatives only if the device uploads enough known CSAM
> pictures, and only for the matching pictures. If there are not enough
> known CSAM pictures uploaded, Apple will be unable to see anything.'
>
> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_David_Forsyth.pdf>
>
>
> 'In conclusion, I believe that the Apple PSI system provides an
> excellent balance between privacy and utility, and will be extremely
> helpful in identifying CSAM content while maintaining a high level of
> user privacy and keeping false positives to a minimum.'
>
> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_Benny_Pinkas.pdf>

"Keeping false positives to a minimum" is not the same as saying they
aren't a problem. Sure, they'll be very minimal but given the hundreds of
millions of iphone users even a 0.001% false positive rate will affect
thousands of people.

Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>
>If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
>that false positives really aren't a problem...

How many times have you heard that before? Don't ever believe it when
anyone says that. Wait for the math, and check it.
--scott
--
"C'est un Nagra. C'est suisse, et tres, tres precis."

In article <sep6d5$ija$1@dont-email.me>, sms
<scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

> But what Apple is planning, scanning content stored locally on your
> device, is more than a little creepy.

it's also wrong. that is *not* what they're planning.

what they're planning is to check *only* photos uploaded to icloud,
exactly what you claim they should be doing, and what other services
have been doing for years.

In article <sep79i$njl$3@dont-email.me>, Alan Baker
<notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:

> On 2021-08-08 11:16 a.m., sms wrote:
> > The other issue that may have an effect in the U.S. is HIPAA.
> >
> > Health care professionals often use corporate-issued or personal iPhones
> > to take clinical photos of patients, whether it's for wounds or other
> > purposes. See <https://www.accountablehq.com/post/hipaa-and-photography>.
> >

....

>
> Nope.
>
> Such photos (clinical photography) wouldn't match the hashes of known CSAM

he knows that.

he's just trolling, like he normally does.

In article <sep7n0$srb$1@dont-email.me>, Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com>
wrote:

> > 'In conclusion, I believe that the Apple PSI system provides an
> > excellent balance between privacy and utility, and will be extremely
> > helpful in identifying CSAM content while maintaining a high level of
> > user privacy and keeping false positives to a minimum.'
> >
> >
> > <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detecti
> > on_Benny_Pinkas.pdf>
>
> "Keeping false positives to a minimum" is not the same as saying they
> aren't a problem. Sure, they'll be very minimal but given the hundreds of
> millions of iphone users even a 0.001% false positive rate will affect
> thousands of people.

which is why it requires a threshold of matches, which triggers a
manual review process, *before* law enforcement is contacted.

nothing is perfect.

do you have a better solution?

In article <sep71m$nsq$1@dont-email.me>, sms
<scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

> The other issue that may have an effect in the U.S. is HIPAA.

it will not.

> Health care professionals often use corporate-issued or personal iPhones
> to take clinical photos of patients, whether it's for wounds or other
> purposes. See <https://www.accountablehq.com/post/hipaa-and-photography>.

those will *not* be in the csam database, therefore not in any way an
issue.

why do you continue to lie about what apple is doing?

> While there are secure cloud storage options for clinical photography,
> on-device scanning could end up flagging photos.

nope. it is not possible for clinical photography to be flagged as
child porn unless the clinician is doing a lot more than just a normal
checkup and distributing such photos.

> If Apple is looking for a way to gracefully back out of this insanity
> then HIPAA could be a good excuse to do so while saving face.

they're not, but you certainly should be.

instead, you're digging yourself a deeper hole.

> iPhones have been especially popular for health care systems because of
> the belief that they are both more secure and provide better privacy
> protection than Android devices.

they are more secure, which contradicts one of your other nonsensical
claims how iphones are not used in health care.

On 2021-08-08 11:27 a.m., Chris wrote:
> Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>> On 2021-08-08 10:10 a.m., Scott Dorsey wrote:
>>> J. P. Gilliver (John) <G6JPG@255soft.uk> wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 7 Aug 2021 at 13:30:12, sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote
>>>> (my responses usually follow points raised):
>>>> []
>>>>> In any case, it's likely that Apple will back down from device
>>>>> scanning, there's just been too much push-back from privacy advocates,
>>>>> LGBTQ+ organizations, and religious freedom groups.
>>>>
>>>> Do you think such push-back will have any _real_ effect? Apple (and any
>>>> other company), whatever they say publicly, are only interested in the
>>>> bottom line. Lots of people _say_ they'll not buy Apple any more if
>>>> Apple do this (or _say_ they'll vote
>>>> Republican/Democrat/Labour/Liberal/Conservative), but I suspect Apple
>>>> have a fairly good grasp of how many will actually _do_ (or not do)
>>>> that. Which is probably not a large number. Especially among (mostly)
>>>> the young who seem less concerned about privacy than we old codgers.
>>>
>>> I don't think the pushback will have any effect, but the lawsuits from
>>> false positives may well have some. At least in the US. The Europeans
>>> seem to take privacy concerns more seriously, and they use Apple products
>>> too.
>>
>> If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
>> that false positives really aren't a problem...
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Technology_Summary.pdf>
>>
>> ...and that's the opinion of people far more knowledgeable than you or I
>> on the subject:
>>
>> 'Apple has found a way to detect and report CSAM offenders while
>> respecting these privacy constraints. When the number of user photos
>> that are in the CSAM database exceeds the threshold, the system is able
>> to detect and report this. Yet a user photo that is not in the CSAM
>> database remains invisible to the system, and users do not learn the
>> contents of the CSAM database.'
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_Mihir_Bellare.pdf>
>>
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mihir_Bellare>
>>
>>
>> 'Apple’s approach preserves privacy better than any other I am aware of:
>> Apple receives an encrypted record from the device for every picture.
>> But cryptographic results guarantee that Apple will be able to see
>> visual derivatives only if the device uploads enough known CSAM
>> pictures, and only for the matching pictures. If there are not enough
>> known CSAM pictures uploaded, Apple will be unable to see anything.'
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_David_Forsyth.pdf>
>>
>>
>> 'In conclusion, I believe that the Apple PSI system provides an
>> excellent balance between privacy and utility, and will be extremely
>> helpful in identifying CSAM content while maintaining a high level of
>> user privacy and keeping false positives to a minimum.'
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_Benny_Pinkas.pdf>
>
> "Keeping false positives to a minimum" is not the same as saying they
> aren't a problem. Sure, they'll be very minimal but given the hundreds of
> millions of iphone users even a 0.001% false positive rate will affect
> thousands of people.
>

Except the "minimum" is described:

'The threshold is set to provide an extremely high level of accuracy and
ensures less than a one in one trillion chance per year of incorrectly
flagging a given account.'

And all that happens if there's a false positive is that the photos that
created that false positive (and ONLY those photos) will then be
examined by a human.

On 2021-08-08 11:31 a.m., Scott Dorsey wrote:
> Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>>
>> If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
>> that false positives really aren't a problem...
>
> How many times have you heard that before? Don't ever believe it when
> anyone says that. Wait for the math, and check it.

That was the point of the adding the comments from the computer
scientists and cryptographic experts: they DID the math.

Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
> On 2021-08-08 11:05 a.m., sms wrote:
>> On 8/8/2021 10:01 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>>> You forget that Gmail also scans your email to detect receipts and group
>>> them together; they also scan for appointments and adds them to your
>>> calendar. Things that some people consider nice features and other
>>> people consider unbearable intrusion. I think it can be disabled.
>>
>> Yeah, it can get a little creepy when your phone advises you of
>> appointments, hotel stays, flights, etc., that are a result of Google
>> scanning your e-mail. It's not an "unbearable intrusion," and it's
>> occasionally helpful, but it still is a little creepy.
>>
>> But what Apple is planning, scanning content stored locally on your
>> device, is more than a little creepy.
>
> Comparing a hash of images on your device to hashes of known images of
> child pornography if and only if you use iCloud Photos.
>
> Doing so in a manner that preserves user privacy; where no human even
> looks at any photo of the user unless a threshold of a certain number of
> positive hits for CSAM is met:
>
> 'Apple’s method of detecting known CSAM is designed with user privacy in
> mind. Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs
> on-device matching using a database of known CSAM image hashes provided
> by NCMEC and other child safety organizations. Apple further transforms
> this database into an unreadable set of hashes that is securely stored
> on users’ devices.
>
> ...
>
> Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching
> process is performed for that image against the unreadable set of known
> CSAM hashes. This matching process is powered by a cryptographic
> technology called private set intersection, which determines if there is
> a match without revealing the result. Private set intersection (PSI)
> allows Apple to learn if an image hash matches the known CSAM image
> hashes, without learning anything about image hashes that do not match.
> PSI also prevents the user from learning whether there was a match.
>
> The device then creates a cryptographic safety voucher that encodes the
> match result. It also encrypts the image’s NeuralHash and a visual
> derivative. This voucher is uploaded to iCloud Photos along with the
> image. Using another technology called threshold secret sharing, the
> system ensures the contents of the safety vouchers cannot be interpreted
> by Apple unless the iCloud Photos account crosses a threshold of known
> CSAM content.
>
> Threshold secret sharing is a cryptographic technique that enables a
> secret to be split into distinct shares so the secret can then only be
> reconstructed if the number of available shares exceeds a predefined
> threshold. For example, if a secret is split into one thousand shares,
> and the threshold is ten, then the secret can be reconstructed from any
> ten of the one thousand shares. However, if only nine shares are
> available, then nothing is revealed about the secret.
>
> Only when the threshold is exceeded does the cryptographic technology
> allow Apple to interpret the contents of the safety vouchers associated
> with the matching CSAM images.'
>
> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Technology_Summary.pdf>
>
> In short, Apple is smarter than you are.
>

Why must every single iPhone user be subjected to this intrusion? Let them
do that to those who have been suspected of such things, and only AFTER a
court order has been issued. They are placing a file on your device and
using precious resources (RAM, CPU, data) to perform a scanning task. We
are all now pronounced guilty to the point of surveillance without any
cause or proof.

On 2021-08-08 11:54 a.m., badgolferman wrote:
> Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>> On 2021-08-08 11:05 a.m., sms wrote:
>>> On 8/8/2021 10:01 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
>>>
>>> <snip>
>>>
>>>> You forget that Gmail also scans your email to detect receipts and group
>>>> them together; they also scan for appointments and adds them to your
>>>> calendar. Things that some people consider nice features and other
>>>> people consider unbearable intrusion. I think it can be disabled.
>>>
>>> Yeah, it can get a little creepy when your phone advises you of
>>> appointments, hotel stays, flights, etc., that are a result of Google
>>> scanning your e-mail. It's not an "unbearable intrusion," and it's
>>> occasionally helpful, but it still is a little creepy.
>>>
>>> But what Apple is planning, scanning content stored locally on your
>>> device, is more than a little creepy.
>>
>> Comparing a hash of images on your device to hashes of known images of
>> child pornography if and only if you use iCloud Photos.
>>
>> Doing so in a manner that preserves user privacy; where no human even
>> looks at any photo of the user unless a threshold of a certain number of
>> positive hits for CSAM is met:
>>
>> 'Apple’s method of detecting known CSAM is designed with user privacy in
>> mind. Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs
>> on-device matching using a database of known CSAM image hashes provided
>> by NCMEC and other child safety organizations. Apple further transforms
>> this database into an unreadable set of hashes that is securely stored
>> on users’ devices.
>>
>> ...
>>
>> Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching
>> process is performed for that image against the unreadable set of known
>> CSAM hashes. This matching process is powered by a cryptographic
>> technology called private set intersection, which determines if there is
>> a match without revealing the result. Private set intersection (PSI)
>> allows Apple to learn if an image hash matches the known CSAM image
>> hashes, without learning anything about image hashes that do not match.
>> PSI also prevents the user from learning whether there was a match.
>>
>> The device then creates a cryptographic safety voucher that encodes the
>> match result. It also encrypts the image’s NeuralHash and a visual
>> derivative. This voucher is uploaded to iCloud Photos along with the
>> image. Using another technology called threshold secret sharing, the
>> system ensures the contents of the safety vouchers cannot be interpreted
>> by Apple unless the iCloud Photos account crosses a threshold of known
>> CSAM content.
>>
>> Threshold secret sharing is a cryptographic technique that enables a
>> secret to be split into distinct shares so the secret can then only be
>> reconstructed if the number of available shares exceeds a predefined
>> threshold. For example, if a secret is split into one thousand shares,
>> and the threshold is ten, then the secret can be reconstructed from any
>> ten of the one thousand shares. However, if only nine shares are
>> available, then nothing is revealed about the secret.
>>
>> Only when the threshold is exceeded does the cryptographic technology
>> allow Apple to interpret the contents of the safety vouchers associated
>> with the matching CSAM images.'
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Technology_Summary.pdf>
>>
>> In short, Apple is smarter than you are.
>>
>
> Why must every single iPhone user be subjected to this intrusion? Let them
> do that to those who have been suspected of such things, and only AFTER a
> court order has been issued. They are placing a file on your device and
> using precious resources (RAM, CPU, data) to perform a scanning task. We
> are all now pronounced guilty to the point of surveillance without any
> cause or proof.
>

What are they actually subjected to?

Does it use a small portion of the devices resources? Yes.

Is the cause sufficiently important? You bet.

No one is pronounced guilty...

....unless it turns out they actually ARE guilty.

In article <sep99c$8i3$1@dont-email.me>, badgolferman
<REMOVETHISbadgolferman@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Why must every single iPhone user be subjected to this intrusion?

they're not. only those trafficking child porn need to be worried.

for everyone else, there is no intrusion.

do you have another solution for finding such people?

> Let them
> do that to those who have been suspected of such things, and only AFTER a
> court order has been issued.

which will happen only if someone is caught uploading child porn.

> They are placing a file on your device and
> using precious resources (RAM, CPU, data) to perform a scanning task.

apple places a lot of files on your device, as do many, many other
companies. that's how computers work.

computing a hash uses a negligible amount of resources, nothing that
ever would be noticed.

the time to upload the photo is both longer and more processor
intensive.

> We
> are all now pronounced guilty to the point of surveillance without any
> cause or proof.

nope.

On 2021-08-08, Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> wrote:
> Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>>
>> If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
>> that false positives really aren't a problem...
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Technology_Summary.pdf>
>>
>> ...and that's the opinion of people far more knowledgeable than you
>> or I on the subject:
>>
>> 'Apple has found a way to detect and report CSAM offenders while
>> respecting these privacy constraints. When the number of user photos
>> that are in the CSAM database exceeds the threshold, the system is
>> able to detect and report this. Yet a user photo that is not in the
>> CSAM database remains invisible to the system, and users do not learn
>> the contents of the CSAM database.'
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_Mihir_Bellare.pdf>
>>
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mihir_Bellare>
>>
>>
>> 'Apple’s approach preserves privacy better than any other I am aware
>> of: Apple receives an encrypted record from the device for every
>> picture. But cryptographic results guarantee that Apple will be able
>> to see visual derivatives only if the device uploads enough known
>> CSAM pictures, and only for the matching pictures. If there are not
>> enough known CSAM pictures uploaded, Apple will be unable to see
>> anything.'
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_David_Forsyth.pdf>
>>
>>
>> 'In conclusion, I believe that the Apple PSI system provides an
>> excellent balance between privacy and utility, and will be extremely
>> helpful in identifying CSAM content while maintaining a high level of
>> user privacy and keeping false positives to a minimum.'
>>
>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_Benny_Pinkas.pdf>
>
> "Keeping false positives to a minimum" is not the same as saying they
> aren't a problem. Sure, they'll be very minimal but given the hundreds
> of millions of iphone users even a 0.001% false positive rate will
> affect thousands of people.

Those theoretical "thousands of people" don't need to worry since when
an account exceeds the threshold of multiple matching photos, Apple
employees will review the metadata and visual derivative of the matching
photos (not the photos themselves) to ensure they aren't just innocent
photos. After review by a human being, only those photos that match are
reviewed. Only legitimate photos of actual child sexual abuse are
forwarded to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NCMEC).

--
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I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

JR

On 2021-08-08, nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> wrote:
> In article <sep7n0$srb$1@dont-email.me>, Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>> 'In conclusion, I believe that the Apple PSI system provides an
>>> excellent balance between privacy and utility, and will be extremely
>>> helpful in identifying CSAM content while maintaining a high level of
>>> user privacy and keeping false positives to a minimum.'
>>>
>>> <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detecti
>>> on_Benny_Pinkas.pdf>
>>
>> "Keeping false positives to a minimum" is not the same as saying they
>> aren't a problem. Sure, they'll be very minimal but given the hundreds of
>> millions of iphone users even a 0.001% false positive rate will affect
>> thousands of people.
>
> which is why it requires a threshold of matches, which triggers a
> manual review process, *before* law enforcement is contacted.
>
> nothing is perfect.
>
> do you have a better solution?

Of course not. He's just here representing the "Apple: BAD!!!" crew.

--
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I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

JR

On 2021-08-08, Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> wrote:
> On 2021-08-08, J. P. Gilliver (John) <G6JPG@255soft.uk> wrote:
>> On Sat, 7 Aug 2021 at 21:02:45, Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> wrote
>> (my responses usually follow points raised):
>>>On 2021-08-07, J. P. Gilliver (John) <G6JPG@255soft.uk> wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 7 Aug 2021 at 16:42:59, Scott Dorsey <kludge@panix.com> wrote
>>>> (my responses usually follow points raised):
>>>>>In article <sehvjg$dql$1@news.mixmin.net>, Anonymous
>>>>><none@example.net> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Apple scanning for images on MY storage system: NOT OK.
>>>>>
>>>>>It's not your storage system. It's Apple's. You only rent it, just
>>>>>like all the other services you rent from Apple.
>>>>
>>>> I think the poster was talking about his 'phone, not his iCloud space.
>>>
>>>Then he's a dumbass. Only photos that are transferred to Apple servers
>>>are examined.
>>>
>> Not, allegedly, from IOS 15.
>
> Whatever that means.
>
> Nothing in that jumble of a sentence disputes or invalidates what I said
> above. Only photos that are transferred to Apple servers are examined.
> Period.
>

According to a blurb on MacRumors, the suspected photos are flagged
prior to sending to the icloud; to be flagged as porn, the photos must
be scanned so it means that the iphone/ipad scanning on the devices.
My question is whether the device owner is notified of the photos
that are flagged as child porn whether they are sent to the icloud or
not. And will the flagged be part of an 'automatic' backup' to the cloud?

On 2021-08-08, Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
> On 2021-08-08 11:27 a.m., Chris wrote:
>>
>> "Keeping false positives to a minimum" is not the same as saying they
>> aren't a problem. Sure, they'll be very minimal but given the
>> hundreds of millions of iphone users even a 0.001% false positive
>> rate will affect thousands of people.
>
> Except the "minimum" is described:
>
> 'The threshold is set to provide an extremely high level of accuracy
> and ensures less than a one in one trillion chance per year of
> incorrectly flagging a given account.'
>
> And all that happens if there's a false positive is that the photos that
> created that false positive (and ONLY those photos) will then be
> examined by a human.

It should also be noted that - unlike Google, Facebook, etc, the only
photos that are reviewed are those that match, and only a visual
derivative is seen by a human being - not the actual photo. The privacy
protections are *significantly* better with Apple's system.

--
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I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

JR

On 2021-08-08, Scott Dorsey <kludge@panix.com> wrote:
> Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>>
>>If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
>>that false positives really aren't a problem...
>
> How many times have you heard that before? Don't ever believe it when
> anyone says that. Wait for the math, and check it.

The math is exactly what the experts quoted above have checked.

Clearly, what you really mean is:

"I don't ever believe anyone who says something that doesn't agree with
my position on the matter."

--
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JR

On 2021-08-08, Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
> On 2021-08-08 11:31 a.m., Scott Dorsey wrote:
>> Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>>>
>>> If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
>>> that false positives really aren't a problem...
>>
>> How many times have you heard that before? Don't ever believe it when
>> anyone says that. Wait for the math, and check it.
>
> That was the point of the adding the comments from the computer
> scientists and cryptographic experts: they DID the math.

He only believes his own "math".

"Do your own research!!1!" *spittle* *sputter*

--
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On 2021-08-08, Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
> On 08/08/2021 19.24, Jolly Roger wrote:
>> On 2021-08-08, Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
>>> On 07/08/2021 22.30, sms wrote:
>>>> On 8/7/2021 12:29 PM, John Robertson wrote:
>>>>> On 2021/08/07 5:55 pm, sms wrote:
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>>>> Apple has the keys. That means there isn't any privacy on the
>>>>> iCloud or in iMessage.
>>>>
>>>> Correct. If you want secure messaging then use Signal. If you want
>>>> secure cloud storage then encrypt whatever you upload to the cloud
>>>> regardless of the provider.
>>>>
>>>>> But at least on your own iPhone you should be able to have
>>>>> privacy. No longer is an iPhone a privacy device after iOS 15.
>>
>> Bullshit, since you can easily opt out by refraining from
>> transferring photos to Apple's servers.
>>
>>>> Well yes, that's why organizations like the Electronic Frontier
>>>> Foundation are so concerned. It's different than Google skimming
>>>> your e-mail for keywords in order to serve up specific advertising.
>>>
>>> You forget that Gmail also scans your email to detect receipts and
>>> group them together; they also scan for appointments and adds them
>>> to your calendar. Things that some people consider nice features and
>>> other people consider unbearable intrusion. I think it can be
>>> disabled.
>>
>> Neither of you have been paying much attention, it seems.
>
> Well, thanks for telling.

Welcome.

>> Google scans everyone's email for child porn, and it just got a man
>> arrested
>> <https://www.theverge.com/2014/8/5/5970141/how-google-scans-your-gmail-for-child-porn>
>> ---
>> Google makes use of Microsoft's PhotoDNA technology to scan
>> emails, and calculate a mathematical hash for an image of child
>> sexual abuse that allows it to recognize photos automatically even if
>> they have been altered. The tech is now also used by both Twitter and
>> Facebook, after Microsoft donated it to the NCMEC in 2009. Videos,
>> too, have become the focus of such digital fingerprinting programs.
>> Google has its own Video ID software for detecting footage of child
>> sexual abuse, and British company Friend MTS donated its Expose F1
>> detection program to the International Centre for Missing & Exploited
>> Children (ICMEC) earlier this year.
>> ---
>>
>> But yeah, "Apple: BAD!!!" : D
>
> Hey, I have not said a single word against Apple in this thread.i

That was more for "sms" and others participating in the discussion.

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On 2021-08-08, sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
> On 8/8/2021 10:01 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>> You forget that Gmail also scans your email to detect receipts and group
>> them together; they also scan for appointments and adds them to your
>> calendar. Things that some people consider nice features and other
>> people consider unbearable intrusion. I think it can be disabled.
>
> Yeah, it can get a little creepy when your phone advises you of
> appointments, hotel stays, flights, etc., that are a result of Google
> scanning your e-mail. It's not an "unbearable intrusion," and it's
> occasionally helpful, but it still is a little creepy.
>
> But what Apple is planning, scanning content stored locally on your
> device, is more than a little creepy.

Nope. Only photos that are transferred to Apple's servers are examined.

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On 2021-08-08, badgolferman <REMOVETHISbadgolferman@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Why must every single iPhone user be subjected to this intrusion?

They aren't. That's a lie.

Only users who transfer photos to Apple's servers are "subjected" to the
system, and only the photos they transfer are examined.

> They are placing a file on your device

"OH MY!!! *clutches pearls* A FILE?! On MY device?!! How dare the
manufacturer of the device I am using put a file on it!!1! HOW DARE THEY
DO SUCH A DASTARDLY THING!!111!!"

Get a grip, grandma. There are tons of files manufacturers place on
devices. There is no new precedent being set as far as this goes.

> and using precious resources (RAM, CPU, data) to perform a scanning
> task

"WHAT?! The manufacturer of my device is using the device's CPU, RAM,
and network throughput for photos I am uploading to their servers?!1!
HOW DARE..."

Shut up and drink your tea, grandma. My god.

> We are all now pronounced guilty

No.

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On 2021-08-08, Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> wrote:
>
Typo fixed:

> Those theoretical "thousands of people" don't need to worry since when
> an account exceeds the threshold of multiple matching photos, Apple
> employees will review the metadata and visual derivative of the matching
> photos (not the photos themselves) to ensure they aren't just innocent
> photos.

After review by a human being, only those photos that are actual child
sexual abuse are forwarded to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC).

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On 2021-08-08, lew <citrustwosac@google.mailer.company.invalid> wrote:
> On 2021-08-08, Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> wrote:
>> On 2021-08-08, J. P. Gilliver (John) <G6JPG@255soft.uk> wrote:
>>> On Sat, 7 Aug 2021 at 21:02:45, Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> wrote
>>> (my responses usually follow points raised):
>>>>On 2021-08-07, J. P. Gilliver (John) <G6JPG@255soft.uk> wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, 7 Aug 2021 at 16:42:59, Scott Dorsey <kludge@panix.com> wrote
>>>>> (my responses usually follow points raised):
>>>>>>In article <sehvjg$dql$1@news.mixmin.net>, Anonymous
>>>>>><none@example.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Apple scanning for images on MY storage system: NOT OK.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>It's not your storage system. It's Apple's. You only rent it,
>>>>>>just like all the other services you rent from Apple.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the poster was talking about his 'phone, not his iCloud
>>>>> space.
>>>>
>>>>Then he's a dumbass. Only photos that are transferred to Apple
>>>>servers are examined.
>>>>
>>> Not, allegedly, from IOS 15.
>>
>> Whatever that means.
>>
>> Nothing in that jumble of a sentence disputes or invalidates what I
>> said above. Only photos that are transferred to Apple servers are
>> examined. Period.
>
> According to a blurb on MacRumors, the suspected photos are flagged
> prior to sending to the icloud

Only photos that are being transferred to Apple servers are examined.

> so it means that the iphone/ipad scanning on the devices.

Yes, and it is done that way so that an encrypted safety voucher
containing the photo metadata and a visual derivative of the photo can
be created and sent to the server with the photo. Only after an account
has exceeded threshold of multiple photo matches to known child sexual
abuse photos is anyone able to decrypt those vouchers for matching
photos, at which point a human being reviews only those vouchers (not
the actual photos) of photos that matched to ensure they are not
innocent photos, but actual child abuse images. Photos that were not
uploaded to Apple servers are not accessible. Photos that did not match
known child sexual abuse images are not accessible.

That is a significant privacy protection that Google, Facebook, and
others who are also using the same database do not offer at this time.

> My question is whether the device owner is notified

If one or more of their photos are verified to be actual child porn,
then you can rest assured, they will find out. : ) Otherwise, their
privacy is retained (see above) and there is no need to notify them.

> will the flagged be part of an 'automatic' backup' to the cloud?

If you back up your device to iCloud and your device has child porn on
it, then of course that backup will contain child porn. Duh...

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Am 08.08.21 um 20:46 schrieb Alan Baker:
> On 2021-08-08 11:31 a.m., Scott Dorsey wrote:
>> Alan Baker <notonyourlife@no.no.no.no> wrote:
>>>
>>> If you'd read up on the system Apple is planning to use, you'd learn
>>> that false positives really aren't a problem...
>>
>> How many times have you heard that before? Don't ever believe it when
>> anyone says that. Wait for the math, and check it.
>
> That was the point of the adding the comments from the computer
> scientists and cryptographic experts: they DID the math.

The same way the experts told the public a nuclear meltdown in a power
station will happen every 10'000 to 100'000 reactor-years.

Reality is: Every 3625 reactor years.

The problem is the number of reactors and in this discussed case the
numer of iPhones.

Source: https://www.mpg.de/forschung/kernenergie-nuklearer-gau
Max Planck Institute.

nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> wrote:
> In article <sep99c$8i3$1@dont-email.me>, badgolferman
> <REMOVETHISbadgolferman@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Why must every single iPhone user be subjected to this intrusion?
>
> they're not. only those trafficking child porn need to be worried.
>
> for everyone else, there is no intrusion.
>
> do you have another solution for finding such people?
>
>> Let them
>> do that to those who have been suspected of such things, and only AFTER a
>> court order has been issued.
>
> which will happen only if someone is caught uploading child porn.
>
>> They are placing a file on your device and
>> using precious resources (RAM, CPU, data) to perform a scanning task.
>
> apple places a lot of files on your device, as do many, many other
> companies. that's how computers work.
>
> computing a hash uses a negligible amount of resources, nothing that
> ever would be noticed.
>
> the time to upload the photo is both longer and more processor
> intensive.
>
>> We
>> are all now pronounced guilty to the point of surveillance without any
>> cause or proof.
>
> nope.
>

This is hilarious! You will defend anything Apple does to the death! Is
there anything they do which is unacceptable and worthy of your scorn?

Why is this action even necessary? I am not defending child porn whatsoever
and think people engaging in such activities should be castrated. But I
resent the very thought that Apple has decided to scan my pictures
whatsoever. Who made them the investigator of any crime, especially a crime
which hasn’t even been committed?

On 8/8/2021 11:54 AM, badgolferman wrote:

<snip>

> Why must every single iPhone user be subjected to this intrusion? Let them
> do that to those who have been suspected of such things, and only AFTER a
> court order has been issued. They are placing a file on your device and
> using precious resources (RAM, CPU, data) to perform a scanning task. We
> are all now pronounced guilty to the point of surveillance without any
> cause or proof.

One claim I've seen is that if you don't use iCloud then the photos on
your device won't be scanned. So there is an opt-out by avoiding the use
of iCloud (or by not upgrading to iOS 15 and/or not buying a new device
with iOS 15 or greater).

What is odd is that if it's that case that only iCloud users are subject
to this "feature" why can the scanning not be done solely on the server
side (where it is already being done by not only Apple but by other
cloud service providers). Perhaps the issue is that it would consume too
many resources on the server so it's better to distribute the task onto
hundreds of millions of user devices.

This whole thing was poorly thought out. In the U.S., this technology
could violate HIPAA if a medical professional used their iPhone for
clinical photography without the use of a secure photo app that encrypts
the photos. There are HIPAA compliant commercial apps like RxPhoto which
do this, but they are very expensive and only large health care systems
are likely to subscribe.