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devel / comp.protocols.kerberos / Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation

SubjectAuthor
o Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generationJeffrey Hutzelman

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Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation

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From: jhutz@cmu.edu (Jeffrey Hutzelman)
Newsgroups: comp.protocols.kerberos
Subject: Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 18:26:18 -0400
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 by: Jeffrey Hutzelman - Thu, 26 Oct 2023 22:26 UTC

The gss-keyex userauth method is just an optimization; it prevents you
having to actually run the GSSAPI exchange again after you've already used
one of the GSSAPI-based keyex methods. The real win is in the GSSAPI-based
keyex methods themselves, which are useful (and exist) because they avoid
having to pick one of these:

1. Jump in blindly and hope there's no MITM on the first connection
2. Distribute copies of all the host public keys to all possible clients
3. Operate a PKI for identifying hosts

Of course, lots of people do (1); ssh has encouraged that since its
earliest days. And around the time I was first working on what became
RFC4462, I was also building 2-3 generations of tooling for (2).

On Thu, Oct 26, 2023 at 5:59 PM Ken Hornstein via Kerberos <kerberos@mit.edu>
wrote:

> >> Unfortunately, ANOTHER one of the "fun" rules I live under is, "Thou
> >> shall have no other PKI than the DoD PKI". And as much as I can
> >> legitimately argue for many of the unusual things that I do, I can't get
> >> away with that one; [...]
> >
> >A CA that issues short-lived certificates (for keys that might be
> >software keys) is morally equivalent to a Kerberos KDC. You ought to be
> >able to deploy such online CAs that issue only short-lived certs.
>
> You know that. I know that. But remember: "if you're explaining,
> you're losing". When asked I can honestly say, "Kerberos is not
> a PKI" and that's good enough, but I can't say with a straight
> face, "This X.509 CA over here is not a PKI".
>
> >Presumably OpenSSH CAs are a different story because they're not x.509?
> :)
>
> Strangely enough, I am not aware of anyone in the DoD that uses OpenSSH
> CAs (there probably are, I just don't know them). I could see it being
> argued both ways. The people I know who use OpenSSH are (a) using
> gssapi-with-mic like us, (b) just using passwords, or (c) using their
> client smartcart key as a key for RSA authentication and they call that
> "DOD PKI authentication". Again, you know and I know that isn't really
> using PKI certificates, but the people up the chain aren't really smart
> enough to understand the distinction; they see that you're using the
> smartcard and that's good enough for them.
>
> >> We _do_ do PKINIT with the DoD PKI today; that is relatively
> >> straightforward with the exception of dealing with certificate
> >> revocation (last time I checked the total size of the DOD CRL package
> >> was approximately 8 million serial numbers, sigh).
> >
> >Don't you have OCSP responders?
>
> We _do_, it's just a pain to find an OCSP responder that can handle that
> many. If the official ones go offline that breaks our KDC so we run our
> own locally.
>
> >One of the problems I'm finding is that SSHv2 client implementations are
> >proliferating, and IDEs nowadays tend to come with one, and not one of
> >them supports GSS-KEYEX, though most of them support gssapi-with-mic, so
> >it makes you want to give up on GSS-KEYEX.
>
> Right, part of the problem there is that people want to "use Kerberos
> with ssh", and they don't understand the difference between gssapi-with-mic
> and gss-keyex.
>
> --Ken
> ________________________________________________
> Kerberos mailing list Kerberos@mit.edu
> https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
>

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server_pubkey.txt

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