On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by changing
>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>
>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>
>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>
>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>
>>>
>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>
>>>> then
>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>
>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>> else left over.
>>>
>>
>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>> limit screws everything up.
>>
>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>
>
>
> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

There is no way to correctly refute that Gödel was definitely wrong
about this.

I would go further and say the the strongest possible rebuttal cannot
do any better than complete nonsense. My reviewer already knows this.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/19/23 10:58 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> There is no way to correctly refute that Gödel was definitely wrong
> about this.
>

What are you trying to refute?

If you want to claim he actually claimed the need to prove a
epistemological antinomy, then show where he did that.

The above does NOT say that.

When put in context, it points to the fact that you can use the FORM of
an epistemological antinomy to form a similar (but logically valid)
statement about provability that shows that there exist statements which
are true but not provable.

This is based on the key difference between claims of a statements Truth
and it Provability. Provable -> True, but True does not imply Provable.
Not True -> Not Provable, but Not Provable does not imply not True.

This asymmetry is important, but apparently unintelligible to you, as
you can't seem to grasp the difference between factual truth and knowledge.

So, since you refuse to even attempt to show where he makes the claim
youy say he is wrong with, you are just plain guilty of using a strawman
arguement (which by your own definitions, makes you a despicable liar).

Now, if you want to refute the claim he ACTUALLY made with those words,
you need to show the error in his actual proof. Since the proof never
actually claims the need to prove an epistemological antinomy, your
argument is proved to be just more of your lies. The statement his base
proof used, was that the statement G was "There does not exist a Natural
Number G that satisfies a (particular primative recursive relationship)"
where that relationship is what most of the paper is spent building up.

Now, such a statement MUST be a truth bearer, as either there does exist
or there doesn't exist some Natural Number that meets that requirement.

Note also, most of the paper is written not working in the Field that
expresses the statement, but in a meta-field of that field, and in that
meta-field, he can prove that G must be True in F, and that G can not be
proven in F.

Again, G is a statement that can not, by definition, be an
epistemological antinomy, as by its nature, it must have a correct
logical answer. If it doesn't, then you are just claiming that all of
mathematics is just wrong, with no more evidence than you saying so.

Since Godel is able to show that G is in fact TRUE, that in itself shows
that G is not an epistemological antinomy, as by definition such a
statement can not be satisfied by either a True or False value.

So, you are just proving your ignorance and stupidity.

> I would go further and say the the strongest possible rebuttal cannot
> do any better than complete nonsense. My reviewer already knows this.
>

So, I guess you are just admitting that your mind is incapable of
understanding the arguement, because everything is just complete
nonsense to you.

That is YOUR problem, not the field of logics. That a total idiot can't
understand how it works is the problem of the idiot, not of logic.

If this is the best arguement you can present, you have just proven you
have wasted your life.

Your are even showing your utter childishness by acting like the mental
giant of a three year old and acting like you are arguing with yourself
because you don't have the strength to face the person you want to argue
with.

On 11/19/2023 9:58 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> There is no way to correctly refute that Gödel was definitely wrong
> about this.
>
> I would go further and say the the strongest possible rebuttal cannot
> do any better than complete nonsense. My reviewer already knows this.
>

It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
is terribly incorrect.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/19/23 11:41 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 9:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate
>>>>>>>> incompleteness
>>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal
>>>>>>>> system}
>>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>
>>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>>> else left over.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>>
>>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> There is no way to correctly refute that Gödel was definitely wrong
>> about this.
>>
>> I would go further and say the the strongest possible rebuttal cannot
>> do any better than complete nonsense. My reviewer already knows this.
>>
>
> It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
> nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
> is terribly incorrect.
>
>

So, you are agreeing that your proof, since it is based on them, i.e.
mentioning them, is terribly incorrect. Thank you for stipulating that.

You haven't shown that Godel used them in any way more than your own
description,

This just shows how ignorant you are of what you are taliking about.

If you want to try to show that the proof is actually based on an
epistemological antinomy has a truth value, show where he does that,
otherwise you are just admitting you don't have a clue and are just puffing.

Also, they aren't "non-sense", they have a lot of semantic meaning, they
just can't be resolved to a truth value, and in fact, can be a great
basis for statements that can be shown to NOT have a truth value, which
is a useful feature in some places.

On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by changing
>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>
>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>
>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>
>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>
>>>
>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>
>>>> then
>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>
>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>> else left over.
>>>
>>
>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>> limit screws everything up.
>>
>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>
>
>
> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
(such as the above sentence) is terribly incorrect.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 9:38 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
> nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
> (such as the above sentence) is terribly incorrect.
>
>

So, you are agreeing that your proof, since it is based on them, i.e.
mentioning them, is terribly incorrect. Thank you for stipulating that.

You haven't shown that Godel used them in any way more than your own
description,

This just shows how ignorant you are of what you are taliking about.

If you want to try to show that the proof is actually based on an
epistemological antinomy has a truth value, show where he does that,
otherwise you are just admitting you don't have a clue and are just puffing.

Also, they aren't "non-sense", they have a lot of semantic meaning, they
just can't be resolved to a truth value, and in fact, can be a great
basis for statements that can be shown to NOT have a truth value, which
is a useful feature in some places.

Just repeating your false claim just proves that you have nothing to go on.

Answer the refutation, or you are just admitting you are a liar.

On 11/20/23 9:38 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
> nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
> (such as the above sentence) is terribly incorrect.
>
>

Also, this shows that you don't understand how logic works.

For example, the classical logical form of "Proof by Contradiction" is a
proof that in one sense of the word is "based" on an epistemological
antinomy, in that it is based on the fact that if from an "assumed true"
statement, you can prove an epistemological antinomy, then that
statement must be false.

If you want to try to define that such a logical argument is incorrect,
then you need to throw out most of the existing logical systems.

Of course, you have shown historically, that you don't understand how
any of the logic works, so it isn't a surprise that you don't understand
this.

You are just proving your utter ignorance of how any of this sort of
logic works, likely because you don't understand this "foreign" concept
of "Truth".

On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by changing
>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>
>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>
>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>
>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>
>>>
>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>
>>>> then
>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>
>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>> else left over.
>>>
>>
>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>> limit screws everything up.
>>
>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>
>
>
> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
(such as the above sentence) is terribly incorrect.

Hopefully the one lying about this does not get the eternal
incineration in the Revelation 21:8 lake of fire required for
"all liars" that seems far too harsh.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter day saints temporary purgatory
like option seems more appropriate.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/2023 8:38 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
> nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
> (such as the above sentence) is terribly incorrect.

Proof by contraction when one begins with a self-contradictory
expression is like trying to make an angel food cake from dog shit.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 10:14 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/20/2023 8:38 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate
>>>>>>>> incompleteness
>>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal
>>>>>>>> system}
>>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>
>>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>>> else left over.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>>
>>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
>> nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
>> (such as the above sentence) is terribly incorrect.
>
> Proof by contraction when one begins with a self-contradictory
> expression is like trying to make an angel food cake from dog shit.
>
>

Who said you started with a self contradictory expression?

You are just showing that you don't understand what is being talked about

You claim Godel starts with a self-contradictory statement, but you
can't actually show where it is, but need to use "simplification" that
aren't even in the logic system that the original statement was made in,
showing your total ignorance of how logic works

All you are doing is proving you are an ignorant pathological liar. (you
seem to be incapable of understanding the nature of your error, thus
PATHOLOGICAL liar)

On 11/20/23 10:12 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> It is dead obvious that epistemological antinomies are semantic
> nonsense thus anyone saying that any proof can be based on them
> (such as the above sentence) is terribly incorrect.

Also, this shows that you don't understand how logic works.

For example, the classical logical form of "Proof by Contradiction" is a
proof that in one sense of the word is "based" on an epistemological
antinomy, in that it is based on the fact that if from an "assumed true"
statement, you can prove an epistemological antinomy, then that
statement must be false.

If you want to try to define that such a logical argument is incorrect,
then you need to throw out most of the existing logical systems.

Of course, you have shown historically, that you don't understand how
any of the logic works, so it isn't a surprise that you don't understand
this.

You are just proving your utter ignorance of how any of this sort of
logic works, likely because you don't understand this "foreign" concept
of "Truth".

>
> Hopefully the one lying about this does not get the eternal
> incineration in the Revelation 21:8 lake of fire required for
> "all liars" that seems far too harsh.

I have no fear of that, but you should,

>
> The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter day saints temporary purgatory
> like option seems more appropriate.
>

So, you don't understand what the Bible actually says and go by the
words of "experts" that have been shown to be liars.

(Apologies to any Mormons offended by my remark, but try to take an
honest look at the history of Joseph Smith and see if he passes the
ancient biblical test of a Prophet)

On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by changing
>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>
>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>
>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>
>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>
>>>
>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>
>>>> then
>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>
>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>> else left over.
>>>
>>
>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>> limit screws everything up.
>>
>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>
>
>
> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
> used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>

"Who said you started with a self contradictory expression?"
Gödel

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 11:13 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>
> "Who said you started with a self contradictory expression?"
> Gödel
>
>

Nope.

You just don't understand what he said.

Show me where he actually started his logic sequence from an actual
self-contradictory statement.

The ACTUAL step of the proof, not just the general statement that the
proof "uses" such a statement.

For instance, the argument by contradiction "uses" a self-contradictory
statement, but it doesn't start with one.

The thing that you don't seem to understand is that it is possible to
start with a sentence, like an epistemological antinomy, and then apply
a semantic and syntactic transformation to it that gives a brand new
statement that isn't logically dependent on the original sentence (and
so your argument fails) but is a way to find a statement with certain
properties.

Your tiny mind seems unable to conceive of this sort of operation, which
is why you are stuck in just low level logic forms.

On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by changing
>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>
>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>
>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>
>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>
>>>
>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>
>>>> then
>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>
>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>> else left over.
>>>
>>
>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>> limit screws everything up.
>>
>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>
>
>
> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

"Who said you started with a self contradictory expression?"

Gödel just said that in the quote above when you understand that
epistemological antinomies are self-contradictory expressions.

*Antinomy*
....term often used in logic and epistemology, when describing a paradox
or unresolvable contradiction.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Antinomy

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 12:18 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> "Who said you started with a self contradictory expression?"
>
> Gödel just said that in the quote above when you understand that
> epistemological antinomies are self-contradictory expressions.
>
> *Antinomy*
> ...term often used in logic and epistemology, when describing a paradox
> or unresolvable contradiction.
> https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Antinomy
>

No, he didn't say that he STARTED the logical chain of reasoning from
the statement in his proof. He USED it. But it wasn't as a proposition
in a logical inference, so your statement is itself, NONSENSE.

You are just proving that you don't understand what you are saying, and
your logic applies just as must to your claim as his.

YOUR statement starts with the use of an epistemological statements, and
thus it must be nonsense.

As I have pointed out, the fact that you can't go into the proof and
show where he actually did what you are claiming, and don't even attempt
it, just shows how utterly stupid your argument is and that you, at
least subconsciously understand that fact.

You just don't understand how logic works, what Truth actually is, or
how to do a proof.

The fact that you refuse to actually respond properly shows that you
have the mental age of a three year old.

You KNOW that, but refuse to acknowledge it, because you mind, and your
logic, is based on lie and deceit. You have been called out on this and
seem to be running scared. You are "projecting" your errors on others
that chalange you, reveling the errors that you know are in your logic.

Sorry, you have ruined your reputation, and are destined to be on the
eternal trash heap because that is all you are worth.

On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by changing
>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>
>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>
>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>
>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>
>>>
>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>
>>>> then
>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>
>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>> else left over.
>>>
>>
>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>> limit screws everything up.
>>
>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>
>
>
> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
> used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

When you understand that an epistemological antinomy is a self-
contradictory expression then the above quoted sentence is
understood to be a ridiculous error.

Even gullible fools will know that changing the subject away
from the above quoted sentence is such a lame attempt at deception
that they will reject such attempts as nonsense.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 1:00 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> When you understand that an epistemological antinomy is a self-
> contradictory expression then the above quoted sentence is
> understood to be a ridiculous error.
>
> Even gullible fools will know that changing the subject away
> from the above quoted sentence is such a lame attempt at deception
> that they will reject such attempts as nonsense.
>
>

You are just repeating yourself and not answering the questions or
responding to the errors that have been pointed out to you repeatedly.

This shows that you are just an ignorant pathological lying TROLL.

I have not change the subject of the sentence, but gone to the core
meaning of the sentence. The fact you don't understand that shows your
utter ignorance of the topic.

I see just three possibilities.

1) You just don't understand the words being used, because you are just
totally untrained in the field, but then the honest responce would be to
ask about the terms that you seem to not understand. That you don't do
this says the even if this is the case, you are not interested in an
Honest discussion.

2) You honestly think these meen something different that how I am using
it. But in this case, again, you should be responding to specific points
to discuss why you see something different out of them. The fact you
don't, means that even if this is the case, you are not interested in an
Honest discussion.

and that just leaves:

3) You are not interested in an honest discussion, but knowing there are
problems with your arguement you intended to just ignore your errors and
propogate your LIES and FALSEHOODS to try to advance your BIG LIE.

Face it, you have lost, your plan has been ripped apart and shown to be
worthless. All you are doing it killing and buring your reputation, and
and small positive things that might be hiding in your ideas.

By doing this, you are just proving yourself to be the sort of person
described in the chapter of Revelation you like to quote, and that the
eternal burning trash heap is your destination, because that is all you
life is worth.

This does seem to match up with your previous cases of claiming it was
ok to have child pornograph, because "you were God", and your mental
derangement where you thought that somehow you were God, but were still
dying of cancer. (Hows that going for you, or was that just more lies),

On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by changing
>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>
>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>
>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>
>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>
>>>
>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>
>>>> then
>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>
>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>> else left over.
>>>
>>
>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>> limit screws everything up.
>>
>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>
>
>
> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

....14 Every epistemological antinomy
AKA every self-contradictory expression

can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...

AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
inference steps proving that self-contradictory
expressions cannot be proven.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 1:56 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy
> AKA every self-contradictory expression
>
> can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>
> AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
> inference steps proving that self-contradictory
> expressions cannot be proven.
>
>

So, you STILL don't understand what you are saying,

By this logic, any proof that mentions epistemological antinomies are
invalid, thus YOUR arguement that mentions them as a grounds to call
proofs invalid is also invalid.

You are just proving yourself to be an ignorant troll.

Try to answer the questions put to you, or just be labeled the troll you
are.

Note, he doesn't say that the sequence of inference steps actually used
the epistemological antinomy, but that concept seems above your
understanding, because you are just too stupid.

On 11/20/2023 12:56 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate incompleteness
>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal system}
>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>
>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>> then
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>> else left over.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>
>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>
>>
>>
>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy
> AKA every self-contradictory expression
>
> can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>
> AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
> inference steps proving that self-contradictory
> expressions cannot be proven.

"By this logic, any proof that mentions epistemological
antinomies are invalid"

Not at all. I didn't say anything like that.

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

*The above sentence proves that the above sentence is incorrect*

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 2:25 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/20/2023 12:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate
>>>>>>>> incompleteness
>>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal
>>>>>>>> system}
>>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>
>>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>>> else left over.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>>
>>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy
>> AKA every self-contradictory expression
>>
>> can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>>
>> AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
>> inference steps proving that self-contradictory
>> expressions cannot be proven.
>
> "By this logic, any proof that mentions epistemological
> antinomies are invalid"
>
> Not at all. I didn't say anything like that.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> *The above sentence proves that the above sentence is incorrect*
>
>

Only under the interpretation of the words that says that "using" an
epistemolgical antinomy in "some" manner makes a proof invalid.

Your arguement "uses" an epistemological antinomy, so is thus invalid.

Note, As I have pointed out, Godel isn't saying that he is using an
epistemological antinomy as a PREMISE to his proof, so your argument
doesn't apply to it.

Your AKA is in INCORRECT inference.

While a "Proof" is a sequence of inference steps, not every statment
"used" by the proof is a premise to the proof.

You seem to have a too simple understanding of a proof.

If you want to disagree with me, point out where in Godel's proof he
actually used an epistemological antinomy as a PREMISE to a logical step
in the proof.

Until you do, you are just shown to be the ignorant pathological lying
troll that you are.

Since you just refuse to actually answer the errors pointed out in your
statements, you are shown to not be discussing in good faith, and are
thus just a troll, and your ideas turn to stone by the light of truth,
so you need to keep your ideas under the darkness of deceit and description.

On 11/20/2023 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/20/2023 12:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate
>>>>>>>> incompleteness
>>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal
>>>>>>>> system}
>>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>
>>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is rejected as
>>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is nothing
>>>>> else left over.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an expression
>>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>>
>>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy
>> AKA every self-contradictory expression
>>
>> can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>>
>> AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
>> inference steps proving that self-contradictory
>> expressions cannot be proven.
>
> "By this logic, any proof that mentions epistemological
> antinomies are invalid"
>
> Not at all. I didn't say anything like that.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> *The above sentence proves that the above sentence is incorrect*

"Note, As I have pointed out, Godel isn't saying that he is using an
epistemological antinomy as a PREMISE to his proof, so your argument
doesn't apply to it."

*Since incompleteness already has a precise definition*
∀L ∈ Formal_System
(Incomplete(L) ≡ ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))

then the epistemological antinomy cannot possibly be correctly
construed as anything besides x in the above expression.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/23 3:08 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/20/2023 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/20/2023 12:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate
>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
>>>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal
>>>>>>>>> system}
>>>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is
>>>>>> rejected as
>>>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is
>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>> else left over.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an
>>>>> expression
>>>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>>>
>>>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>>>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>>>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy
>>> AKA every self-contradictory expression
>>>
>>> can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>>>
>>> AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
>>> inference steps proving that self-contradictory
>>> expressions cannot be proven.
>>
>> "By this logic, any proof that mentions epistemological
>> antinomies are invalid"
>>
>> Not at all. I didn't say anything like that.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> *The above sentence proves that the above sentence is incorrect*
>
> "Note, As I have pointed out, Godel isn't saying that he is using an
> epistemological antinomy as a PREMISE to his proof, so your argument
> doesn't apply to it."
>
> *Since incompleteness already has a precise definition*
> ∀L ∈ Formal_System
> (Incomplete(L) ≡ ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))
>
> then the epistemological antinomy cannot possibly be correctly
> construed as anything besides x in the above expression.
>
>

So, you are presuming (INCORRECTLY) that the x in this formula is an
epistemological antinomy in Godel's Proof

It isn't.

But since you don't seem to be able to understand what Godel's G is, and
are too arogent to learn, you are doomed to just being ignorantly wrong.

Note, G is NOT the statement, even in "effect", that G asserts that it
can not be proven.

G is the statement that there does not exist a Natural Number g, that
meets a specifically defined Primitive Recursive Relationship.

And that is all that G is in the field F.

Such a statement MUST be a "Truth Bearer" as either a number g exists
that meets the requirement or it doesn't. That is a basic fact of the
mathematics of Natural Numbers, either numbers exist that meet a
computable property, or they don't, there is no "fuzzy" state between or
outside.

The key point of the proof, is that the specific PRR was built in a
meta-F that has the enumeration of all the axioms of F, assigning them
to numbers, and an encoding system that can express ANY statement, or
series of statements in F as a number, and the PRR is constructed so
that a number that satisfies it WILL be an encoding of a proof of the
statement G, and any proof that might exist in F, will have a number.

And the complicated paper is the proof that such a PRR can be constructed.

Given that we can construct such a PRR, and ask about a number
satisfying it, we can then show in meta-F that the existance of a number
that satisfies the PRR has an identical truth value to the provability
of the statement G in F. Thus the existance of the number g has the same
truth value as the provability of G in F, or the non-existance of the
number g has the same truth value as the unprovability of G in F.

Thus since G asserts that there is no number g, that means we can
logically derive from G the statements that G is true if, and only if, G
is unprovable, thus it is this DERIVED statement that is the statement
of a statement that asserts its own unprovability, and this statement is
in meta-F, not F.

On 11/20/2023 2:08 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/20/2023 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/20/2023 12:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate
>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
>>>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal
>>>>>>>>> system}
>>>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is
>>>>>> rejected as
>>>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is
>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>> else left over.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an
>>>>> expression
>>>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>>>
>>>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>>>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>>>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy
>>> AKA every self-contradictory expression
>>>
>>> can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>>>
>>> AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
>>> inference steps proving that self-contradictory
>>> expressions cannot be proven.
>>
>> "By this logic, any proof that mentions epistemological
>> antinomies are invalid"
>>
>> Not at all. I didn't say anything like that.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> *The above sentence proves that the above sentence is incorrect*
>
> "Note, As I have pointed out, Godel isn't saying that he is using an
> epistemological antinomy as a PREMISE to his proof, so your argument
> doesn't apply to it."
>
> *Since incompleteness already has a precise definition*
> ∀L ∈ Formal_System
> (Incomplete(L) ≡ ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))
>
> then the epistemological antinomy cannot possibly be correctly
> construed as anything besides x in the above expression.

"So, you are presuming (INCORRECTLY) that the x in this
formula is an epistemological antinomy in Godel's Proof"

*I am presuming nothing* There is no possible other place
to correctly insert the epistemological antinomy in the
definition of incompleteness besides x.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 11/20/2023 2:08 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/20/2023 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/20/2023 12:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2023 5:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/19/2023 3:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/19/2023 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 12:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 11/18/2023 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> ZFC was able to reject epistemological antinomies by screening
>>>>>>>>> out the pathological self-reference derived by sets as members
>>>>>>>>> of themselves. Russell's Paradox was eliminated be defining set
>>>>>>>>> theory differently.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the same way that Russell's Paradox was eliminated we can
>>>>>>>>> get rid of other epistemological antinomies. It is pretty
>>>>>>>>> obvious that epistemological antinomies are simply semantically
>>>>>>>>> unsound.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we define True(L, x) as (L ⊢ x) provable from the axioms
>>>>>>>>> of L, then epistemological antinomies become simply untrue and
>>>>>>>>> no longer show incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Since we have already fixed the undecidability issue of Russell's
>>>>>>>>> Paradox by redefining set theory the precedent has already been
>>>>>>>>> set that we can correct these issues by redefining the meaning
>>>>>>>>> of their terms.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Because the undecidability of Russell's Paradox was fixed by
>>>>>>>>> changing
>>>>>>>>> the meaning of the term {set theory} we can eliminate
>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
>>>>>>>>> and undecidability by redefining meaning of the term {formal
>>>>>>>>> system}
>>>>>>>>> as detailed above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We can eliminate incompleteness and undecidability derived by
>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies by redefining meaning of the term
>>>>>>>> {formal system} as detailed above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For the halting problem H(D,D) simply screens out and rejects
>>>>>>>> input D that is defined to do the opposite of whatever Boolean
>>>>>>>> value that H returns.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference {AKA epistemological antinomies}
>>>>>>>> cannot possibly create incompleteness or undecidability when it
>>>>>>>> is simply screened out as erroneous.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we imagine that every detail of the body of human
>>>>>>> knowledge has been formalized as higher order logic then
>>>>>>> the only incompleteness are unknowns.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is the way that human knowledge actually works:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>>> False(L,x) is defined as (L ⊢ ~x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This includes all human knowledge and excludes unknowns.
>>>>>> Your prior reply only glanced at a few of my words and thus did not
>>>>>> bother to notice that I was talking about the set of human knowledge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply rejected as not truth
>>>>>>> bearers and do not derive incompleteness or undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Every expression that is neither provable nor refutable is
>>>>>> rejected as
>>>>>> not a truth bearer, (within this formal system) thus epistemological
>>>>>> antinomies are excluded and unknowns are excluded and there is
>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>> else left over.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we stipulate that a truthmaker is what-so-ever makes an
>>>>> expression
>>>>> of language true then we can know by tautology that every truth has a
>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we arbitrarily limit the set of truthmakers then this arbitrarily
>>>>> limit screws everything up.
>>>>>
>>>>> To define a proof as a finite set of inference steps creates the
>>>>> artificial notion of unprovable truths.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My most important point of all this is that epistemological antinomies
>>>> are finally understood to simply be semantic nonsense that do not
>>>> actually prove incompleteness, undecidability or undefinability.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy
>>> AKA every self-contradictory expression
>>>
>>> can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>>>
>>> AKA can likewise be used to provide a sequence of
>>> inference steps proving that self-contradictory
>>> expressions cannot be proven.
>>
>> "By this logic, any proof that mentions epistemological
>> antinomies are invalid"
>>
>> Not at all. I didn't say anything like that.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> *The above sentence proves that the above sentence is incorrect*
>
> "Note, As I have pointed out, Godel isn't saying that he is using an
> epistemological antinomy as a PREMISE to his proof, so your argument
> doesn't apply to it."
>
> *Since incompleteness already has a precise definition*
> ∀L ∈ Formal_System
> (Incomplete(L) ≡ ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))
>
> then the epistemological antinomy cannot possibly be correctly
> construed as anything besides x in the above expression.

"So, you are presuming (INCORRECTLY) that the x in this
formula is an epistemological antinomy in Godel's Proof"

*I am presuming nothing* There is no possible other place
to correctly insert the epistemological antinomy in the
definition of incompleteness besides x.

Also again and again and again I have only been talking
about this one freaking quote in everyone of my last
very many messages:

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer